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The Future of Social Security
By Professor Holley Hewitt Ulbrich
1998
In 1995, the Social Security system took in revenue of $452 billion, including $31 billion in 
interest, and paid benefits (including administrative costs) of $352 billion, for a net increase in 
assets of $72 billion, which was added to the accumulated balance of $550 billion. The system
covers 133 million workers and serves 50.8 million beneficiaries, of whom 37.8 million are
getting retirement and survivors benefits. This is big business. It deserves careful attention. Most
of that attention has been focused on these projections:
In the year 2019 benefit payments will begin to exceed current taxes and interest. 
By 2029 the accumulated surplus will be exhausted. 
As are any economic projections, these are based on assumptions about wage growth (1% a year 
adjusted for inflation), fertility, longevity, interest rates, marital stability, immigration, labor 
force participation (especially by women), and unemployment. Robert Kuttner1 points out that if
wages were to grow at their average rate of the last 50 years (1.7%), then the doomsday scenario 
is replaced by one that envisions the system in the black for the indefinite future. Other 
assumptions, likewise, can be wrong because projecting for so long a period for so large a system
is very sensitive to even minor adjustments in the assumptions. 
Discussions of Social Security often get bogged down in issues relating to Medicare and SSI 
(Supplementary Security Income), both of which are important, but for the great mass of
working Americans, the primary interest right now lies in the old age, survivors, and disability 
program (OASDI) put in place between 1935 and 1950. This core business of Social Security is
an intergenerational and interpersonal compact, reflecting both individual and communal values. 
Every industrial country has something similar except Japan, which relies on private savings and 
families. Our design reflects the values/context of the 1930s: individualism, earned benefits, 
some redistribution, and married women not working outside the home. OASDI is a hybrid of
insurance, pension, and redistribution programs. Hybrids can be the best of both parents or the
worst, sometimes both. Consider the mule, which is stubborn, sturdy, and sterile! 
The insurance component consists of survivors (1939) and disability (1950) programs. Disability 
is relatively new and much more complex than old age and survivors programs, especially in the
establishment of eligibility. Recent publicity has focused on two issues: children getting 
disability payments (which are SSI, not OASDI), and payments to people disabled because they 
are substance abusers, which is currently under review. 
The pension/annuity component is the earliest, and the one we think of when we say Social
Security. If you return to the original discussions when this program was being designed you will
be reminded of something current critics gloss over. This system was designed by the middle
class to defend itself from the poor. Knowing that the middle and upper income groups were





























group was not likely to save for old age, a purpose of the program was to force the working poor 
to contribute something while they were working. Thus, an element of the design was protecting 
the middle class and the rich from the poor! 
Having said that, however, we must acknowledge that Social Security has a strong redistribution 
component (a much higher ratio of benefits to earnings for lower income earners). The lowest
income recipients, or those not covered, are shunted off to SSI, which replaced Aid to the Aged, 
some disability, and General Assistance in the 1970s. This program is often confused with Social
Security but is in fact separate, funded by general tax revenues. 
An essential feature of the design was broad coverage, a breadth that has continued to grow as
such groups as state and local employees, ministers, self-employed persons, farm workers and 
other groups were added to the system over the years. Today there is close to universal
participation among those employed, a feature that results in two positive benefits -- low
administrative costs (about 1.5% of benefits paid), and no adverse selection. Those who expect
to live to a ripe and healthy old age share the system with those who expect to die young or to be
disabled before reaching retirement age. 
Other important design features include the wage ceiling or maximum amount subject to Social
Security taxes ($61,200 in 1995, adjusted annually, the tax rate (currently 6.1% by employer and 
employee for OASDI and another 1.49% each for Medicare), the coverage of wages only 
(excluding other forms of income), the annual inflation adjustment, the loss of benefits for 
earning above a certain ceiling, and the marriage penalty for widows and widowers. This last
feature is one of several problems related to the differential treatment of wives of retired or 
disabled workers and women workers, with an increasing proportion of women being eligible for 
either (but not both) types of benefits. 
Many of the concerns about Social Security can be described as equity issues, relating to 
interpersonal equity and intergenerational equity. 
Interpersonal equity is often measured as the ratio of lifetime taxes to lifetime benefits. These
calculations, which appear in the popular press, are not easy to make; there is no typical
earner/recipient, and each person's calculation depends on how long you live, what your earnings
pattern was, and other factors. A recent issue of the Social Security Bulletin reviewed and 
critiqued various money's worth studies that looked at such measures as payback period, 
benefit/tax ratio, lifetime transfer, and internal rate of return. It is important, in making such 
comparisons, to compare apples with apples, considering among other issues the level of risk 
assumed in the investment mix (it is very low for Social Security Trust Fund investments), and 
being sure to include administrative costs (also very low for Social Security)2. 
Within age cohorts (people born during the same period), it is estimated that the return is better 
for couples, women, minorities and the poor, because women and couples live longer and lower 
income groups (including a disproportionate share of minorities) receive a higher ratio of
benefits to earnings. The present value of taxes less benefits is very positive for lowest income
decile, remaining positive up to the middle of the income distribution, and is negative for the top 
































More attention has been paid recently to intergenerational equity; some critics describe its "pay-
as-you-go" nature as a sort of Ponzi scheme, with the baby bust generation (1965 onward) left
holding the bag. Again, looking at age cohorts, researchers found that the earliest cohort
examined (1895-1903) earned on average a 12.5% inflation-adjusted return; the 1917-22 cohort
received 5.9%, while the babies born in 1995 are projected to receive a 1.5% inflation-adjusted 
rate of return. All of these figures compare favorably to a long- term 0.6% inflation-adjusted 
return on government bonds.3 
One important consequence of Social Security has been reduced poverty among the elderly. 
More than half of those current elderly receive more than half their income from Social Security 
. Among current workers, about 1/2 are covered by a pension plan; the others, apparently, are
depending on Social Security to provide for their old age. What will happen to the benefits to the
elderly and the rates paid by active workers down the road? Again, there is no simple answer: it
depends on fertility, longevity, earnings growth, interest rates, marital stability, immigration, 
labor force participation, and unemployment. 
There is no lack of proposals for reform. The following is a brief summary of some of the
proposals currently on the table. 
1. Delinking Social Security from the budget, so that the reported deficit does not count the
net revenue of the trust funds against the operating deficit. This procedure, strongly 
advocated by Senator Hollings and others, makes balancing the budget much harder, 
since these revenues are currently covering about 1/3 of the deficit. 
2. Capping the cost of living adjustment (COLA). There is considerable evidence that the
Consumer Price Index currently used to adjust benefits is overstating inflation, and 
particularly the impact of inflation on the elderly, because of the strong role of housing 
and medical costs in the index. Many of the elderly are not affected by rising costs of
buying new homes, as they live in homes that are paid for, and much of their medical
expense is covered by Medicare. Proposals include a lower adjustment or a link to growth 
in wages rather than in prices. 
3. Changing the assumptions. Congress and the President have argued this issue on 
projecting the budget deficit for a mere seven years; the projected problems in Social
Security come in a period some 23 to 33 years hence, and are crucially dependent on 
assumptions about wage growth, fertility, labor force participation, and immigration. It
only takes very small adjustments in some of these assumptions to make the system
viable. Perhaps the cries of disaster are premature. 
4. Adjusting the age for eligibility. With longer life spans, retirees are collecting much 
longer, and more are opting to collect reduced benefits at 62 rather than full benefits at
age 65. A change scheduled in another five years beginning with the 1940 birth cohort, 
still permitting benefits at age 62 but gradually raising the age at which full benefits are
available. 
5. Reforming or delinking other components of the system, such as disability eligibility, and 
Medicare. Some argue that Social Security is bearing too many unrelated responsibilities, 
and should be pared back to its "core business"--a form of downsizing or reengineering. 

































be scrapped but that they involve other issues and should be separated and treated 
differently. 
6. Treatment of employed v. not employed women. Since the payroll tax includes payments
for survivor benefits, it can be argued that married couples pay twice, but can only collect
once. Widows can collect either on their own earnings record or 80% of the benefit that
would have been received by their deceased husbands; retired wives, likewise, can collect
full benefits on their own records or 50% of their husbands' benefits. This issue will
eventually self-correct as women being employed outside the home becomes the norm
rather than the exception. In the interim, it is important not to penalize those who got
caught in a values revolution. 
7. Increasing the wage base. The wage ceiling has gone up, but the existence of a ceiling 
means that the fringe benefit cost doesn't continue to rise beyond a certain point. As a
result, the tax is somewhat regressive. In fact, the Social Security payroll tax is biggest
single tax burden for the working poor. Broadening the base would raise a more revenue, 
and make the tax more equitable. 
8. Changing the investment mix. Some reformer would like to see at least part of the Trust
Fund's $550 billion in assets invested in equities, for two reasons. First, the fund would 
experience greater growth, although at some cost in terms of risk and management
expense. Second, this change would help to delink the trust fund from the budget deficit, 
since it would no longer be invested entirely in Treasury securities. 
9. Making the system private and/or voluntary. Barry Goldwater suggested this idea in 
1964, and never recovered. Today we see it in the Readers' Digest. Privatizing, while
keeping participation mandatory, would create a need for monitoring and supervision, 
given the history problems with private pensions and with investment advisors. Making it
voluntary will results in many of the poor opting out in order to provide for immediate
consumption. Both would reduce or eliminate the insurance and redistribution functions
of the system to function in its role as a pension provider. None of these problems are
insuperable obstacles to making such a change, but they are real problems that would 
have to be addressed in some way. 
10.
Like the former editor of The (Baltimore) Sun, I feel called upon to respond to those
doubters and questioners of our age, but my correspondent is my 29-year-old daughter, 
who like Virginia O'Hanlon, has serious doubts about the future of this particular Santa. 
Yes, Carla, Social Security will be there when you turn 65 in 2031, because it is too 
politically costly to kill it. Benefits will be lower in relation to your income than they 
were for me and Dad, but it will be there, still financed largely by a dedicated tax on 
earnings of some kind, still favoring lower income workers over higher income workers. 
Part of the trust fund will probably be invested in the economy, in equities and corporate
bonds, to provide diversity and growth and to delink SS from the broader question of the
budget. The people paying into the system will be different: more women, more
minorities, more recent immigrants. Even if you do get married, when you retire you will
probably be eligible only on your own account: the few surviving dependent spouses will
have been shifted to SSI, and the survivors' component of the program will have
diminished, in order to focus on the core businesses of disability and retirement. But we
as a people are committed to ensuring that our elderly do not have to move in with their 






              
  
               
    
             





              
              
 
that there will be an opportunity to enjoy a little gold in the golden years. We do that in 
our own self-interest, looking after our elderly in hopes that the torch will pass to the next
generation who will look after us. I think you can count on that mix of altruism and self-
interest to ensure that there will be some provision, in some form, for you when your turn 
comes. 
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